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INTRODUCTION

Beginning at a young age, individuals start choosing to exclude
others. Toddlers decide who will be their snack-time seatmates.
Children choose whom to exclude from their playground dodge ball
team. College fraternities and sororities induct only chosen classmates
into their organizations. Businesses pick their preferred employees from
stacks of applications.
The ability to include or exclude individuals is often taken for
granted as an individual's or organization's assumed right. But what
happens when an organization refuses to admit a member because she is
female? Or because he is Latino? Or because she identifies as a lesbian?
Does eradicating discrimination trump one's choice of association?
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,' the Supreme Court stated that
one's "freedom of association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate." 2 However, the Court also recognized that "[i]nfringements on
that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests. . . .

Discrimination based on archaic and overbroad

assumptions ... deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies
society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic and
cultural life." 3
A modem-day civil rights battle rages between groups asserting
their constitutional right of expressive association 4 and states attempting
to eliminate discrimination by enacting non-discrimination statutes. This
Comment will argue that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize that
eradicating sexual orientation-based discrimination is a compelling state
interest. It will also suggest a proposal for balancing an organization's
right of freedom of association with a state's interest in eradicating
discrimination through non-discrimination statutes.

1. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
2. Id. at 623 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)).
3. Id. at 623, 625.
4. Expressive association is an individual's right to associate with others while
carrying out the First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion; its
purpose is to "preserv[e] other individual liberties." Id. at 618.
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First, this Comment will begin by providing background
information 5 : it will trace the development of the freedom of expressive
association jurisprudence, the proliferation of non-discrimination laws
for state-protected classes, and the convergence of these two areas in the
Supreme Court's strict scrutiny "balancing test" provided in Roberts.6
Second, this Comment will analyze whether the Supreme Court's
test provides the best possible balance between federal constitutional
expressive association rights and the non-discrimination rights of stateprotected classes. This Comment will discuss the application of Roberts
to gender discrimination cases, arguing that those cases "got it right" by:
(1) recognizing that a state has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination, and (2) substantively applying the Supreme Court's strict
scrutiny test.7 Then, this Comment will scrutinize how the gender
discrimination cases "got it wrong" by failing to substantively apply the
Court's own compelling state interest standard in instances where
organizations discriminated against individuals protected by state nondiscrimination laws. 8 Finally, this Comment will suggest that, when
applying the Court's rationale in the gender discrimination cases, the
Court should recognize that eradicating sexual orientation discrimination
is a compelling state interest.9
This Comment will conclude by proposing a "better balance" by
altering the Court's current strict scrutiny standard to better serve cases
involving sexual orientation discrimination.' 0 The proposal of this
Comment achieves two goals: (1) it provides a specific definition of
compelling state interest; and (2) it creates a demanding, two-prong
standard that organizations attempting to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation must meet in order to exclude individuals.
II.

BACKGROUND: GETTING TO THE "BALANCE"

To properly analyze the Supreme Court's current balancing test" as
announced in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, one should first
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part III. This Comment does not attempt to analyze potential courtrelated pitfalls and claims of parties alleging sexual orientation discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause. See U.S. CONST., amend XIV. For an analysis of equal
protection jurisprudence that includes a discussion of sexual orientation discrimination,
see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REv. 747 (2011).
10. See infra PartIV.
11. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 ("The right to associate for expressive purposes is
not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
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understand why this test was developed. The background of this
Comment will show the history behind the Roberts balancing test by
tracing the development of freedom of expressive association, the
development of state non-discrimination laws, and the convergence of
these two areas in the Supreme Court's balancing test.12
A.

Development ofFreedom ofExpressive Association

The freedom of expressive association is rooted in the First
Amendment of the Constitution, 3 which states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." 4 The Court then extrapolated
It
on the concept of freedom of religion, speech, and assembly.,
recognized that, to carry out these First Amendment freedoms,
individuals must have a right of association for the purpose of
"preserving other individual liberties."' 6
The jurisprudence then splits into two types of expressive
Group expressive
intimate' 7 and organizational.' 8
association:
association, as recognized by the Court, permits a group or organization
to engage in efforts, like speech and assembly, to effectuate their
constitutional rights; associational freedom encompasses one's right "to
associate with a wide range of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends."' 9
Several cases supply the rich history of organizational freedom of
expressive association. First, in NAACP v. Alabama,20 the Court
addressed the issue of whether the State Attorney General of Alabama
could compel the NAACP to reveal the names and addresses of all of its
members. 2 1 The Court held that, while the state had not directly curtailed
the members' rights to associate within the organization, the state's
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.").
12. See infra Parts II.A.-C.
13. See U.S. CONsT., amend. I.
14. Id.
15. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
16. Id.
17. Intimate association preserves "certain kinds of highly personal relationships"
from state interference; examples include freedom to marry and raise one's children. See
id. Intimate association is not a topic discussed in this Comment.
18. See id. at 622.
19. Id.
20. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
21. Id. at 450.
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disclosure requirement created "the likelihood of substantial restraint" on
the members' right to associate. 22 Because the state created a significant
indirect effect on the members' ability to associate within the group, the
Court found the state requirement unconstitutional. 23 The oft-quoted
portion from NAACP is that "effective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once
recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly."2 4
A second example of Court-recognized expressive association rights
is provided in Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalitionfor FairHousing
v. Berkeley. 25 The city of Berkeley imposed an ordinance that limited
contributions to committees supporting or opposing ballot measures;
however, the ordinance imposed no such limit on individuals supporting
or opposing the same measures.26 The ordinance affected only those
persons who attempted to effectuate political change while acting in
concert. Therefore, the Court found that the state infringed on
27
individuals' freedom to express themselves through group association.
The third example of Court-recognized freedom of expressive
association is found in the watershed case of Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, which will be discussed at length, infra Part III. In Roberts, the
Jaycees organization challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota
statute that would require the organization to admit women. 28 In
discussing whether the group had an expressive association claim, the
Roberts Court clearly stated the foundation for the right of expressive
association:
According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is
especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and
in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority....
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe upon this
freedom can take a number of forms...

. [G]overnment may seek to

impose penalties or withhold benefits from individuals because of
their membership in a disfavored group . . . it may attempt to require
disclosure of the fact of membership . . . and it may try to interfere
22. Id. at 462.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 460.
25. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981).
26. See id at 292.
27. See id. at 299-300.
28. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984).
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with the internal organization or affairs of the group.

association therefore plainly presupposes
associate.29

. .

. Freedom of

a freedom

not to

To effectively protect First Amendment rights, the Court recognized
an organization's freedom to engage in expressive association.30 This
right affords protection from the government's interference into an
organization's speech, assembly, and group membership.3' However,
this associational right was soon called into question by states' nondiscrimination statutes. 32
B.

Development of State Non-DiscriminationLaws: From Race to
Gender to Sexual Orientation

A conflict with associational rights emerged when states
promulgated civil rights and public accommodation laws. These laws
forced organizations to include or admit certain individuals by
prohibiting organizations' use of selection criteria based on race, gender,
and, in some instances, sexual orientation.33 This forced-inclusion
caused many to question what happened to the Court's principle that
"freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate." 34 This section will analyze the historical development of
states' non-discrimination statutes in the context of cases and statutes
that will be discussed later in the Comment.
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s led to the
enactment of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.35 This statute
prohibits public accommodations and employers from discriminating on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. 36 States soon
followed suit and enacted their own public accommodation statutes. One
example of protecting race as a class is the New York statute found in
New York Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York,n which prohibits
discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement
29. Id at 622-23.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See N.Y. Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (New York
statute prohibiting race-based discrimination); see also Md. v. Burning Tree Club, 554
A.2d 266 (Md. 1989) (Maryland Constitution prohibiting sex-based discrimination); see
also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-sexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting sexual orientation-based discrimination).
34. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
35. The public accommodations portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2006).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2006).
37. N.Y. Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
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on the basis of, inter alia, race, color, or national origin." Today, fortyfive states and the District of Columbia have enacted public
accommodation statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. 39
In addition to protecting race as a class, women also received class
protection under various state laws.4 0 Maryland v. Burning Tree Club4 1
discusses Maryland's constitutional provision mandating that equality of
42
rights under the law not be abridged or denied because of sex. Many
states have adopted similar provisions that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex, either in their constitutions or in their equal protection
statutes.43 The federal government, through Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, also recognizes gender as a protected class, especially in the
area of discrimination in employment.44
More recently, some states have recognized sexual orientation as a
protected class by prohibiting discrimination in places of public
accommodation on the basis of one's sexual orientation. Examples of
these statutes are found in both Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
Bi-sexual Group of Boston45 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.46
Massachusetts's statute, discussed in Hurley, applies to public
accommodations and prohibits "distinction, discrimination, or restriction
on account of . .. sexual orientation."47 New Jersey's statute, discussed
in Dale, prohibits, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of one's sexual
orientation in broadly defined places of public accommodation.48
Currently, eighteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation.4 9
38. Id (citing N.Y.C. LOCAL LAw No. 63, § 1, App. 14-15 (1985)).
39. The states that have not enacted these statutes are Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas. See Anne-Marie G. Harris, A Survey of Federal
and State Public Accommodations Statutes: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Cases of
Retail Discrimination,13 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 331, 340 (2006).
40. See infra note 43.
41. Md. v. Burning Tree Club, 554 A.2d 366 (Md. 1989).
42. See MD. CONST., art. XLVI.
43. Representative laws are found in the following states: Pennsylvania, see PA.
CONST. § 28; Maryland, see Md. CONST., art. XLVI; and California, see CAL. CONST., art.
1 §§ 8, 31(a).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
45. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-sexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
46. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS. 272 § 98 (2008).
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5 (West 2002).
49. These states include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
See Laws
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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States' laws and constitutions regarding discrimination, either in the
context of public accommodations or employment, have evolved with the
cultural climate of the time. From the women's liberation movement to
the civil rights era to the cultural acceptance of individuals identifying as
gay, lesbian, or bi-sexual, states have recognized the importance of
eradicating discrimination against certain classes of individuals.so
However, the states' mandate against discrimination was not supreme
forever; the Supreme Court developed a balancing test to weigh a state's
interest in eradicating discrimination against one's right of expressive
association.'
C.

The Two Converge: The Supreme Court's "Balancing" Test

The Court's balancing current test is one of strict scrutiny: does the
state's law mandating non-discrimination serve a compelling state
interest with no less restrictive means of serving that purpose? 52
However, as illustrated below, that specific inquiry is only considered
after the Court has satisfied two other separate lines of inquiry: one line
inquires into the state's public accommodation laws and the other line of
inquiry delves into the constitutional freedom of expressive association.5 3

ProhibitingDiscriminationBased on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, INST. OF
REAL ESTATE MGMT. (Jul. 2007), http://www.irem.org/pdfs/publicpolicy/Antidiscrimination.pdf.
50. See supra Part I.B.
51. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
52. Id.
53. The information found in this flowchart is taken from the Court's analysis in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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STATE GOVERNMENT:

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE

I163

ASSOCATION

*Is the organization a "public
accomodation" under the statute's
definition?
*Is there a statutory exception to
the definition of "public
accomodation" that precludes
application?

*Is the organization engaged in
"expressive association"?
*Would inclusion of an individual
"significantly affect" the
organization's ability to advocate
its viewpoints?

CONVERGENCE OF
STATE

& FEDERAL

LAW

*Does the state law infringe on the constitutional
right of expressive association?
*Does the law serve a "compelling state interest"
with no less restrictive means of doing so?

In application, the inquiries of "compelling state interest" and
"significant effect" are combined into a two-prong balancing test. To
successfully argue that an organization or public accommodation must
include certain individuals, one must prove that the compelling state
interests override any significant effect that the inclusion of certain
individuals may have on the organization's ability to advocate its
viewpoint.54 This section outlined the Supreme Court's current test for
state laws infringing on constitutional associational freedoms; the next
section will demonstrate the Court's application of the strict scrutiny
analysis in two contexts: gender and sexual orientation.

54. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620, 626-27 (stating that the compelling state interest of
eradicating gender discrimination overrides any effect on the Jaycees' ability "to
disseminate its preferred views").
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III. ANALYSIS: A TRUE BALANCE?

The Gender DiscriminationCases: What the Courts Got Right

A.

In a line of cases decided in the 1980s, courts recognized a
compelling state interest in eradicating discrimination perpetrated by
organizations against women and successfully applied the previously
discussed Roberts test. First, the courts analyzed what state interests
Then, the court
existed in eradicating gender discrimination.56
determined whether those interests rose to the level of "compelling."57
Finally, the courts tried to ascertain the potential effects that inclusion
would have upon the organization.
The gender discrimination cases cited several interests that the
various courts considered to be "compelling": assuring equal access to
goods and services; removing economic, political, and social barriers that
historically plagued disadvantaged groups; encouraging wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life; and advancing the
individual dignity of all persons. 59 Additionally, the Court recognized
that including women would not significantly affect the ability of any of
the organizations at issue to advocate for or present their viewpoints to
the public. 60
The landmark inclusion case, Roberts, applied Minnesota's nondiscrimination law 1 to the United States Jaycees organization, which
55.

See supra Part II.C.

56. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624-25 (enumerating state interests in eradicating
gender discrimination).
57. See id. at 626 (stating factors that make a state interest "compelling").
58. See id. at 627 (determining effect on organization when state forces inclusion of
individuals).
59. Id at 624-26. One may argue that the Court found these interests to be
compelling because gender is a suspect class and the Court may not find the same
compelling interests when sexual orientation is involved, because sexual orientation is
not a suspect class. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). However, this Comment
contends that the same compelling interests that the Roberts court found in eradicating
gender discrimination also exist in the context of sexual orientation discrimination,
regardless of the Court's classification of the class of persons being discriminated
against. See infra Part III.C.
60. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627; see also Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
61. The Minnesota statute analyzed reads, "It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
'To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because
of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex."' Roberts, 468 U.S. at
615 (citing MrNN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982)). The Court determined that the
Jaycees organization was a public accommodation under the statutory definition (a
"public business facility") and to which the public accommodation statute applies
because: (1) it is a business, exchanging goods and privileges for monetary dues; (2) it is
public, soliciting its business based on "an unselective criteria"; and (3) it is a facility,
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refused to admit women into one class of its organizational
membership. 6 2 The Roberts Court found that Minnesota had compelling
interests in eradicating gender discrimination. 6 3 The Court cited to the
"changing nature" 64 of the American economy and the importance of
removing barriers that have hindered the advancement of women, a
historically disadvantaged group, in social, political, and economic
spheres. 5 The Court stated that any impact on the associational rights of
the Jaycees' male members was minimal when compared to those
previously-mentioned compelling state interests of eradicating gender
discrimination and ensuring gender equality.6 6
Another organization, Rotary International, also struggled with
gender discrimination in the 1980s. 6 7 One specific club, The Rotary
Club of Duarte, admitted women as members.68 Because of this
admission, Rotary International threatened to remove the Duarte
Rotary's recognition as a Rotary Club. 6 9 The Duarte Rotary alleged that
this removal would violate California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.70 In
analyzing Duarte's suit against the international organization, the Court
found that forcing inclusion of women into the Rotary might infringe on
the organization's unbridled associational freedom. 7
However,
associational freedoms may be limited by state action satisfying the
Court's strict scrutiny test. 72 Here, the Court found, for reasons similar
to the Roberts Court, that eliminating gender discrimination was a
compelling state interest. 73 The Court also determined that forcing the
Rotary to include women would not significantly affect the
organization's ability to advocate its stated viewpoint, which was to

conducting its activities at various fixed or mobile sites throughout the State. Roberts,
468 U.S. at 616.
62. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 ("Regular membership is limited to young men
between the ages of 18 and 35, while associate membership is available to persons
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and older men.").
63. See id. at 626.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 623.
67. The Rotary International Constitution stated that membership in its clubs was
available to men only. See Rotary Club ofDuarte, 481 U.S. at 541.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 541-42.
70. The Civil Rights Act states, "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are
free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges,
or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id. at 542 n.2
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 1982)).
71. Id. at 549.
72. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
73. Rotary Club ofDuarte,481 U.S. at 549.
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facilitate fellowship and promote service through a membership body
that constitutes a wide cross-section of businesses. 74
Maryland v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 7 provided another analysis of
gender discrimination. While this case is not a forced-inclusion case, the
Maryland Court of Appeals analyzed the facts through the lens of
Roberts. Here, the Burning Tree Club (the Club) refused to admit
women into its country club, which violated the Maryland's equal rights
amendment to its Constitution. 7 6 The Club, however, questioned the
validity of a state statute that denied tax benefits to country clubs that
engaged in gender discrimination, arguing that this statute impermissibly
infringed on its associational freedom.77 The court held that the statute
did not impermissibly infringe on the Club's associational freedom.
Because the statute did not force the Club to admit women, but denied
the Club a benefit because of its discriminatory practices, the court
applied an intermediate scrutiny test, finding a "compelling interest
justifying the imposition of [the preferential tax assessment] burden." 79
Specifically, the court recognized that Maryland's enactment of its equal
rights amendment "made a commitment to equal rights for women which
elevates the goal of eliminating state-supported sex discrimination to a
compelling state interest."80
In this line of cases, the courts "got it right" in two specific ways.
First, the courts correctly looked to the substance of the states' interests
to analyze whether those interests were compelling, rather than merely
concluding that interests were or were not compelling. 1 Ultimately, the
courts found compelling interests in the following substantive areas
when addressing gender discrimination cases: assuring equal access to
goods and services, removing barriers that have historically plagued
disadvantaged groups, encouraging wide participation in political,

74. While the organization argued that "the exclusion of women results in an 'aspect
of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male membership,"' the Court found that
the fellowship enjoyed by male membership was slight when compared to the state's
compelling interest in eliminating gender discrimination. Id. at 541, 549.
75. Md. v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366 (Md. 1989).
76. The Constitutional provision mandates that the equality of rights under the law
not be abridged or denied because of sex. MD. CONST., art. XLVI.
77. Burning Tree Club, 554 A.2d at 377.
78. Id at 377-78.
79. See id. at 384.
80. Id
81. See supra Part III.A. for a discussion of the courts' analyses of gender
discrimination in Maryland. v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366 (Md. 1989), Board
of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), and
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). The cases in which the United
State Supreme Court did not substantively analyze states' interests are discussed infra
Part III.B.
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economic, and cultural life, and advancing the individual dignity of all
persons. 82 Second, the courts "got it right" by focusing their analyses of
compelling state interests on the state's own constitution or statute.83
Placing emphasis on state-enacted statutes provides the courts with
insight into what, specifically, the state considers a compelling interest.
This focus on state law is important because the court is supposed to be
analyzing the state's interests, not the interests of the federal
government. 84 Unfortunately, courts did not use this same rationale and
apply this same emphasis when determining the outcome of the sexual
orientation discrimination cases.ss
B.

The Sexual OrientationDiscriminationCases: What the Court Got
Wrong

The United States Supreme Court has refused to find that
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling state
interest.86 In fact, the Court has either failed to apply or conducted a
cursory analysis of its own strict scrutiny test to cases where
This
organizations exclude individuals based on sexual orientation.
section analyzes two cases to demonstrate that the Court "got it wrong"
in its analysis of these sexual orientation discrimination cases.
In Hurley, the Court failed to apply its strict scrutiny test at all,
upholding parade organizers' exclusion of an Irish-American gay,
lesbian, and bi-sexual group ("GLBI") that wished to march in the
Following the test set up in Roberts, the Court should have
parade.
inquired into four areas. First, in analyzing the state statute, the Court
needed to determine: (a) whether the parade organizers were prohibited
from discriminating by a state public accommodation statute, and (b)
82. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624-26 (1984).
83. See Burning Tree Club, 554 A.2d at 384 (stating that Maryland's enacting a
Constitutional provision that elevated the goal of eradicating discrimination created a
compelling state interest).
84. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (holding that compelling state interests are what
may justify a state's infringement on the right of expressive association) (emphasis
added).
85. See infra Part Ill.B.
86. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (stating that no state
interests in New Jersey's public accommodation law justified re-admitting gay
scoutmaster Dale to the Boy Scouts organization).
87. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (applying free speech analysis but failing to apply strict scrutiny test); see
also Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (finding no "compelling state interest" without full discussion of
potential state interests). Without mere conjecture, one cannot state that the Court's
failure to apply the balancing test or its cursory application of the balancing test is an
intentional avoidance of the "hot-button" topic of sexual orientation discrimination.
88. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73.
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whether that statute applied in this situation. 89 Second, in analyzing the
constitutional right, the Court needed to determine: (a) whether the
excluding organization was engaged in expressive association, and
(b) whether the inclusion of the GLBI would significantly affect the
parade organizers from advocating their viewpoints. 90 Third, if the first
two lines of inquiry were satisfied, then the Court must determine
whether the state law requiring inclusion infringed on the organization's
constitutional associational rights.91 Finally, the Court must apply the
strict scrutiny test: does the state's law prohibiting discrimination, and
thereby mandating inclusion, serve a compelling state interest with no
less restrictive means of serving that interest? 92
In analyzing the parade organizers' First Amendment rights, the
Court found that the organization was engaging in expressive conduct
and, as such, was entitled to First Amendment protection. 93 However,
when the Court turned to the application of Massachusetts's public
accommodation statute 94 to the parade, it held that the state court
improperly applied the statute to the parade. 95 The Court did not view
the parade as a place of public accommodation. 9 6 Instead, it determined
that the "speech" of the parade itself was not a public accommodation. 9 7

89. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615-17 (determining whether a public accommodation
statute existed and was applicable).
90. See id at 623-27 (applying a public accommodation statute to the freedom of
organizational association and determining affect of inclusion of certain members).
91. See id at 628 (stating affect of public accommodation statute on constitutional
associational rights).
92. See id. at 626 (stating the strict scrutiny test as the Court applied it to the Jaycees
organization).
93. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 567.
94. The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation
"in the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement." Id. at 572 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS § 272:98 (1992)).
95. See id. at 572-73.
96. See id
97. In its opinion, the Court clarified this imaginative logic as follows:
In the case before us . . . the Massachusetts law has been applied in a peculiar
way. Its enforcement does not address any dispute about the participation of
openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the
parade. Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no
individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a
member of any group that the Council has approved to march. Instead, the
disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its
own banner. . . . Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed
by the private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced
an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their
parade. Although the state courts spoke of the parade as a place of public
accommodation .

. . ,

once the expressive character of both the parade and the

marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that the state
courts' application of the statute had the effect of declaring the sponsor's
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As such, the Court held that the public accommodation statute did not
apply; the parade organizers were entitled to express their chosen
message without any infringement by GLBI.98
The Court did not address whether the parade itself was a public
accommodation to which the statute applied, which was the position of
the state court. 99 Unfortunately, the Court's implied adoption of the state
court's position allowed the Court to avoid applying the strict scrutiny
test at all. In this case, there is no discussion of what effect GLBI would
have on the parade organizers' message or whether Massachusetts had
compelling interests in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination that
trump the potential effect of inclusion of the GLBI. In framing the issue
as it did,100 the Court ignored its balancing test.
While Hurley demonstrates the Court's avoidance of the balancing
test,"o' Boy Scouts of America v. Dale exemplifies the Court's
unwillingness to substantively apply its balancing test. Here, the Boy
Scouts removed a scoutmaster from his post after he publicly espoused a
gay sexual orientation; the Court did not require that the Boy Scouts re-

admit him. 10 2
First, in analyzing the state statute, the Court found New Jersey's
public accommodation law applicable to the Boy Scouts organization;
second, in analyzing the constitutional associational rights, the Court
determined that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive association. 10 3
Third, the Court determined that the organization's espoused viewpoint,
based on testimony at trial, was that "the organization does not want to
promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."l 04 The
Boy Scouts argued that homosexual conduct was "inconsistent with the
speech itself to be the public accommodation. Under this approach any
contingent of protected individuals with a message would have the right to
participate in petitioners' speech, so that the communication produced by the
private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by the law who
wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own. But this
use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message.
Id (citations omitted).
98. See id. (stating that the "peculiar" application of the statute to the parade was
incorrect). The state court viewed the parade as a public accommodation, a fact that the
Supreme Court seemed not to dispute; however, the Court did not address the parade and,
instead, focused on its argument that the public accommodation statute was inapplicable
to the speech in the parade. See id.
99. See id.
100. See supra note 97.
101. See supra Part III.B.
102. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000).
103. Id. at 640-41.
104. Id. at 641.
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values" of the Boy Scouts as embodied in its Oath and Law. 0 5
Therefore, in analyzing the significant effect of including Dale in the
Boy Scouts organization, the Court stated that Dale's position as an
Assistant Scoutmaster would harm the Boy Scouts' ability to express its
viewpoint-that a homosexual lifestyle is not a legitimate lifestyle
choice. 106
The next step of analysis, according to Roberts, is to apply the strict
scrutiny test-whether the statute restricting associational freedoms
serves a compelling state interest that can be achieved by no less
restrictive means.'0 7 Instead of performing this analysis, the Dale Court
stumbled. The Court did not undertake a substantive review of the
state's interests in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination and did
not determine whether those enumerated interests rose to the level of
"compelling," as it did in the gender discrimination cases. Rather, the
Court concluded, without further discussion of the state interests
involved, that "[tihe state interests embodied in New Jersey's public
accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy
Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association."' 08 The Court
merely paid lip service to its own test. It focused on significant effect,
only one part of the applicable balancing test, and failed to substantively
analyze what interests New Jersey has in eradicating sexual orientation
discrimination, the second part of the balancing test.' 09
Thus, in the sexual orientation discrimination cases, the Court "got
it wrong." First, it failed to apply its strict scrutiny test, sidestepping the
issue entirely. 0 Second, it failed to substantively apply the test, merely
reciting "no compelling state interest" without engaging in a meaningful
discussion of state interests and the factors that make those interests
compelling."'
C.

Connecting Gender and Sexual OrientationDiscrimination: Why
Both Are Compelling State Interests

Had the Court undertaken a substantive analysis of compelling state
interests in the sexual orientation discrimination cases, it might have

105.

The Oath and Law espouses the values of being "morally straight" and "clean."

Id
106. Id.
107. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
108. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
109. See id (stating that "[t]he state interests ... do not justify such a severe intrusion
on the Boy Scout's rights to freedom of expressive association" without further
discussion of the state interests at issue).
110. See supra Part II.B.
111. See supraPart III.B.
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recognized a compelling state interest in eradicating sexual orientation
The Court-recognized rationale behind eradicating
discrimination.
gender discrimination can be analogous to eradicating sexual orientation
discrimination. In fact, various social statistical studies demonstrate that
the same concerns that permit states' prohibition of gender
discrimination exist in sexual orientation discrimination.'12
As mentioned previously, the Court stated several compelling
interests that states have in eradicating gender discrimination. These
interests include: (1) assuring equal access to goods and services;
(2) removing economic, political, and social barriers that historically
plagued disadvantaged groups; (3) encouraging wide participation in
political, economic, and cultural life; and (4) advancing the individuals'
dignity."13
Several of these enumerated interests have particular implications in
the realm of sexual orientation discrimination.1 14 Demonstrated acts of
discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation have
created economic barriers for this group, have discouraged their wide
participation in economic and cultural life, and have denigrated these
individuals' dignity.'" 5 Examples of these effects of discrimination are
discussed in the context of the following two social scientific studies.
Sexual orientation discrimination has created significant wage
effects for sexual minorities.' 16 A study published by Cornell University
found that gay and bisexual male workers earned a statistically
significant 11 to 27 percent less than heterosexual male workers, even
though the workers in the two groups had the same experience,
education, occupation, marital status, and geographic residence.1 7 The
same study found a wage difference, though not consistently statistically
significant, of between 12 and 30 percent between lesbian or bisexual

112. See M. V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual OrientationDiscrimination,
48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 4 (Jul. 1995) (describing the economic effects of sexual
orientation discrimination on those who identify themselves as sexual minorities); see
also Gregory M. Herek, Hate Crimes and Stigma-Related Experiences Among Sexual
Minority Adults in the United States: PrevalenceEstimates From a National Probability
Sample, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 7, 2008), http://jiv.sagepub.com/content/
early/2008/04/07/ 0886260508316477 (describing the social effects of crimes against

sexual minorities).
113. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624-26 (1984).
114. See infra Part Ill.C.
115.

See Badgett, supra note

112 (describing the economic effects of sexual

orientation discrimination on those who identify themselves as sexual minorities); see
also Herek, supra note 112 (describing the social effects of crimes against sexual
minorities).
116. See Badgett, supra note 112, at 737.
117. Id.
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women and heterosexual women." 8 This study shows that sexual
minorities encounter significant economic barriers to full participation in
the country's economic life, and the Court has recognized that
eradicating economic barriers that hinder full participation in the
country's economic life is a compelling state interest.119
A second study 2 0 demonstrates the social barriers and denigration
of individual dignity that exist in the wake of sexual orientation
discrimination. The Herek study analyzed the prevalence of hate crimes
and manifested sexual stigma' 2 1 against sexual orientation minorities,
and the effects of those crimes and manifested stigma against those who
identify themselves as sexual minorities. The data in this study indicated
that, since the age of eighteen, approximately 20 percent of the sexual
minority population in the United States has experienced a crime against
person or property based on their sexual orientation.122 When attempted
crimes were added to instances of perpetrated crimes, the percentage
increased to 25 percent.12 3 Additionally, about half of the sexual
minority population reported victimization by the sexual stigma of verbal
abuse or harassment during their adult life, and more than 10 percent
experienced housing or employment discrimination.12 4
The existence of wage discrimination and the prevalence of hate
crimes and manifested stigmas against gay, lesbian, or bi-sexual
individuals demonstrates the economic and social barriers that exist for
sexual minorities.12 5 Eradicating discrimination against sexual minorities
through non-discrimination statutes, therefore, will advance the Courtrecognized compelling state interests of removing social barriers,
encouraging wide participation in economic and cultural life, and
advancing individuals' dignity.12 6
The Court has recognized compelling state interests in eradicating
gender discrimination.1 27 As previously suggested, the same compelling
state interests support the need for eradicating sexual orientation

118. Id.
119. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1984).
120. Gregory M. Herek, Hate Crimes and Stigma-Related Experiences Among Sexual
Minority Adults in the United States: Prevalence Estimates From a National Probability
Sample, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 7, 2008), http://jiv.sagepub.com/content/
early/2008/04/07/ 0886260508316477.
121. The study defines sexual stigma as "society's negative regard for any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community." Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id.
124.

Id. at 15-16.

125.
126.
127.

See supra Part III.C.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624-26 (1984).
See id. at 625-26.

2012]

A RIGHT TO EXCLUDE OR FORCED TO INCLUDE?

1173

discrimination.12 8 Therefore, the Court should recognize that eradicating
sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling state interest.
IV. PROPOSAL: A BETTER BALANCE

As discussed above, states likely have a compelling interest in
Therefore, it is
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination. 129
imperative to achieve a better balance between the groups' rights to
engage in expressive association and sexual minorities' rights to not be
This Comment proposes that the
subject to discrimination.
by implementing the following
be
achieved
balance
can
aforementioned
two standards. First, the Supreme Court should better define and
substantively apply the concept of "compelling state interest." Second,
the Court should impose a demanding, yet achievable, standard upon
organizations that exclude certain individuals through the exercise of
their First Amendment rights, which should satisfy two prongs: (1) the
organization must provide clear and convincing pre-trial evidence of the
organization's viewpoint, and (2) the trial court must undertake a factspecific inquiry into how the excluded person will interfere with the
organization's previously-established viewpoint.
A.

CompellingState Interest: New Definition, True Application

Initially, the courts must apply a uniform definition of compelling
state interest. In one gender discrimination case, a state court recognized
that the placement of a non-discrimination provision in the state's
constitution created a compelling state interest.130 Federal courts should
follow suit. The courts should accept the rule that, if a state expressly
includes non-discrimination of a particular class in its statutes or
constitution, that state recognizes a compelling state interest in
eradicating discrimination against that class of persons. If the state
recognizes the existence of that compelling state interest in its statues or
constitution, the federal court should also recognize the existence of that
compelling state interest. After all, the standard that a court is to apply,
per Roberts, is "compelling state interest,"l31 not "compelling national

128. See supra Part Ill.C.
129. See supra Part III.C.
130. See Md. v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 384 (Md. 1989) (stating that
Maryland's enacting a constitutional provision that elevated the goal of eradicating
discrimination created a compelling state interest).
131. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (holding that compelling state interests are what
may justify a state's infringement on the right of expressive association) (emphasis
added).
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interest." 32 The courts should recognize compelling state interests
where the state expressly recognizes compelling interests.
However, any definitional changes will be moot if the courts apply
a mere cursory analysis to the compelling state interest standard. This
Comment has discussed the Court's non-application and superficial
application of the compelling state interest standard to sexual orientation
discrimination cases.133 Ultimately, for any definitional changes to be
effective, the judiciary must be committed to substantive application of
the compelling interest standard in subsequent sexual orientation
discrimination cases.
B.

Significant Effect: Clarifying & Strengthening The Standard

Currently, the Supreme Court applies a significant effect standard:
it requires an organization exercising its freedom of expressive
association to show how including the excluded individual will
significantly affect the organization's viewpoint.134 However, both
evidentiary problems in Dale and the Supreme Court's most recent
controversial application of Roberts to sexual orientation discrimination
demonstrate the need for a clearer, more demanding evidentiary
standard. In order to clarify and strengthen the Court's existing standard
for application to sexual orientation discrimination cases, the courts
should implement the following two prongs.
1.

Clear & Convincing Evidence

First, the organization should be required to establish through clear
and convincing evidence that, prior to trial, the organization had
established viewpoints on the negative effects of one's sexual orientation
on the organization. The court should take into consideration several
factors to determine if clear and convincing evidence of pre-trial and prelitigation viewpoints exist, including the organization's charter
document, mission statement, board meeting minutes, or like evidence.
132. A search of articles discussing whether courts address sexual orientation
discrimination in the context of compelling national interest revealed only a cursory
sentence attributed to a National Public Radio broadcast, stating that, in an interview with
Richard Green, he "opined that in light of a genetic basis for homosexuality, laws
discriminating against gays could be upheld only if they fulfilled a compelling national
interest." Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritanceand the Modern Family, 45 CASE WES. RES.
L. REv. 83, 161 n.249 (1994). The focus of courts appears to be on the compelling state
interest standard enumerated in Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
133. See supra, Part 11I.B.
134. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (stating that the Court
must determine if an individual's presence "significantly burdens" an espoused
organizational viewpoint).
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Evidentiary problems in Dale confirm the need for clear and
convincing pre-trial evidence of an organization's viewpoint. In Dale,
the court relied heavily on organizational statements that were either
promulgated in anticipation of litigation or were evidentiary materials
from prior litigation.135 The problem with a court's reliance on official,
organizational statements prompted solely by litigation is the self-serving
nature of such statements. An organization can make statements in
anticipation of litigation, in briefs, or at trial that simply serve the
interests of its claims of "negative effect of organizational message."
Therefore, by relying on clear and convincing pre-trial evidence not
made in anticipation of litigation, the court can truly evince the
organization's established viewpoints.
2.

A Fact-Specific Inquiry

Second, the trial court must make a fact-specific inquiry into how
forced inclusion of an individual with a certain sexual orientation might
have a significant adverse effect on the organization's ability to advocate
for its viewpoint. The court should consider certain factors when
analyzing a gay, lesbian, or bi-sexual individual's "significant effect" on
an organization, including the following: (1) the excluded individual's
proposed position in the organization, (2) the public or private nature of
the person's position, and (3) the relationship between the individual's
proposed position and the viewpoints of the organization.
Again, certain evidentiary problems in Dale demonstrate the need
for a more fact-specific inquiry into a person's significant effect on an
organization's viewpoint. 13 6 The majority in Dale stated that, because
Dale identified as a gay male, his mere presence as an Assistant
Scoutmaster would "force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." 37
However, in his dissenting opinion in Dale, Justice Stevens
disagreed with the majority's rationale, seemingly recognizing the
importance of the Court's application of a fact-specific inquiry to
determine significant effect. He focused on the nexus between a
member's position, that individual's personal beliefs, and the
organization's espoused viewpoints; ultimately, he noted a very limited,

135. These relied-upon statements include the following: assertions made in the Boy
Scouts of America's briefs for the Dale case; a statement regarding homosexuality
admitted in evidence at a trial in the 1980's; and a position statement formulated in 1991,
after Dale's membership was revoked. See id at 651-52.
136. See infra Part IV.B.2.
137. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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perhaps even non-existent, connection between these three areas of
inquiry:
It is not likely that [Boy Scouts of America (BSA)] would be
understood to send any message, either to Scouts or to the world,
simply by admitting someone as a member.... The notion that an
organization of that size and enormous prestige implicitly endorses
the views that each of those adults may express in a non-Scouting
context is simply mind boggling.

..

. It is equally farfetched to assert

that Dale's open declaration of his homosexuality, reported in a local
newspaper, will effectively force BSA to send a message to anyone
simply because it allows Dale to be an Assistant Scoutmaster. 138
Implementing the fact-specific inquiry above139 will place a greater
burden on organizations attempting to exclude gay, lesbian, or bi-sexual
individuals. This increased burden is justified because, if courts can
merely conclude that a "significant effect" exists, without actually
undertaking a substantive review of the facts of the case, discrimination
may run rampant, unchecked by actual facts or evidence of true effect.
C.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

In analyzing this Comment's proposal, it is important to analyze
potential benefits and costs that might flow from refining the definition
of compelling state interest and strengthening the "significant effect"
standard.140 The potential cost associated with these changes is increased
litigation,141 while the potential benefits include promoting the
eradication of discrimination against sexual orientation minorities and
promoting judicial efficiency.142 The potential to both increase litigation
and promote judicial efficiency may seem at odds with each other;
however, the following two sections explain how the two elements may
co-exist under this Comment's proposal.14 3
1.

Potential Cost: Increased Litigation

This Comment's proposal suggests that, when faced with a case
involving a group's exclusion of an individual based on his or her sexual
orientation, the court should engage in two lines of inquiry. First, the
court should attempt to uncover clear and convincing evidence, in

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.C.I.
See infra Part IV.C.L.

A
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existence prior to litigation, that the individual's sexual orientation will
have a significant adverse effect on the organization's viewpoint.
Second, the court should conduct a fact-specific inquiry into how forced
inclusion of an individual with a minority sexual orientation might have
a significant adverse effect on the organization's ability to advocate for

its viewpoint. 144
A litigious standard may arise when this fact-specific inquiry and
search for clear and convincing evidence are placed in the court's hands.
Under this standard, the court alone will determine whether the factors
that create significant effect exist and whether a defendant has provided
clear and convincing pre-trial evidence of its viewpoint on how sexual
orientation affects its organizational message. Therefore, the potential
for increased litigation exists under this proposed standard.
2.

Potential Benefits: Judicial Efficiency and Equality

However, two significant benefits are likely to arise under this
proposal: the promotion of judicial efficiency and the eradication of
discrimination.
First, while litigation may initially arise under this standard, the
standard may give way to judicial efficiency in states that choose to
protect sexual orientation as a class through their statutes or
constitutions. If organizations expect that the court will recognize a
compelling interest in a state's statutorily- or constitutionally-protected
sexual orientation class, 14 5 then those organizations may have a weaker
claim of protection under expressive association and may be less likely
to bring that claim. Organizations will also know the factors the court
will apply in forced inclusion cases and the burden that such
organizations must meet to overcome the court-recognized compelling
state interest.14 6 Armed with this knowledge, organizations will be less
likely to continue litigation, rendering the judicial process more efficient.
Second, this Comment's proposed changes to expressive association
jurisprudence likely will achieve the eradication of discrimination against
gay, lesbian, and bi-sexual individuals. Under the proposed standard, an
organization will be required not only to prove the existence of its
established belief that an individual's sexual orientation will significantly
affect its viewpoint, but also to prove to the court that the inclusion of the
excluded individual will, indeed, affect its ability to advocate for its
viewpoint.14 7 By requiring organizations that discriminate to satisfy this
144.
145.
146.

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.

147.

See supra Part IV.B.
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fact-intensive inquiry, the standard may discourage discrimination by
organizations that merely dislike or disapprove of individuals of a certain
sexual orientation when those individuals may have no effect on the
organization's ability to advocate its viewpoint.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Roberts balancing test, the Court's attempt to give credence to
both states' compelling interests in eradicating discrimination and an
individual or organization's freedom of expressive association, falls short
when it is applied to sexual orientation discrimination cases. 14 8 The
Supreme Court recognizes a compelling state interest in eradicating
gender discrimination, 149 stating that this discrimination "both deprives
persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life." 50 Because the
same compelling state interests that support gender equality also support
sexual orientation equality, 5 1 the Court "got it wrong" in failing to
recognize that eradicating sexual orientation discrimination is a
compelling state interest.
Ultimately, if one accepts this Comment's suggestion that states that
choose to enact sexual orientation discrimination statutes have a
compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination, then
a better balance must be struck between the constitutional right of groups
to engage in expressive association and a state-recognized right of
individuals not to be discriminated against by organizations based on
one's sexual orientation. This balance can be achieved through imposing
a demanding yet achievable standard on organizations that exclude gay,
lesbian, and bi-sexual individuals. An organization may overcome the
compelling state interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination
by: (1) providing clear and convincing evidence, in existence prior to
litigation, of the organization's belief that the individual's sexual
orientation will have a significant effect on the organization's viewpoint,
and (2) proving to the court that a gay, lesbian, or bi-sexual individual
will actually have a significant effect on the organization's ability to
advocate its viewpoint.1 52 In determining the significant effect of an
excluded individual upon the organization's viewpoint, the court should
analyze the individual's proposed position in the organization, the public
148. See supra Part III.C.
149. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (ensuring women's equal
access to organization's membership and removing sex-based discrimination is a
compelling state interest).
150. Id. at 625.
151. See supra Part II.C.
152. See supra Parts IV.B.L -2.
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or private nature of the person's position, and the relationship between
the individual's proposed position and the viewpoints of the
organization.153
While this fact- and factor-specific standard may initially increase
litigation, the emergence of a clear definition of "compelling state
interest" and a clear standard for "significant effect" through litigation
may decrease the number of expressive association violation claims.' 54
Additionally, this Comment's proposal will likely achieve the important
goal of eradicating discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bi-sexual
individuals by emphasizing the Court-recognized ideal of promoting
individuals' economic advancement, dignity, and social and cultural
participation.155

153.
154.
155.

See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.C.2.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624-26.
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